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Installment Credit: A Social Perspective
THOMAS E. WILLGING*
I. INTRODUCTION
POVERTY IN AMERICA has recently become the focal point for government ac-
tion on the federal level, and indirectly on the state level, in the Economic
Opportunity Act of 1964. Implicit in the fiber of that legislation is the prin-
ciple that local social welfare agencies can help the poor improve their con-
dition by providing a broad range of social services, focusing principally on
job training and community action programs designed to uplift the neigh-
borhood environment.' Included in the shot-gun spray of this anti-poverty
legislation, at least in some of the local plans thus far approved by the Office
of Economic Opportunity, is an attack on the problems of the low-income
consumer. While consumer problems among low-income families are myriad
and often camouflaged in the economic structure of our society, the author
seeks to document in this article some of the "unfair sales practices" of local
merchants and to discuss existing, proposed, and potential remedies to these
abuses.
* Legal Assistant, Neighborhood Legal Services Project, Washington, D.C. A. B. (1962
The Catholic University of America); LL. B. (1965 The Catholic University School of Law).
The original draft of this paper was the product of a seminar course in The Use of Social
Science Materials in Trial and Appellate Proceedings offered at Catholic University School
of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges the constructive criticisms and research sug-
gestions of the participants in that course and especially the guidance of Professor Albert
Broderick, 0. P. and Professor Richard Arens. Many of the author's first-hand experiences
with installment buying occurred under the tutelage of Jonathan Weiss, Esq., a staff at-
torney with the Neighborhood Legal Services Project in Washington, D. C. and many of the
ideas expressed in this article are a product of joint discussion and research which is an
invaluable part of the article. The author also expresses his gratitude to Joanne Cogan and
Maureen Higgins, for their secretarial assistance.
'For an introduction to the conceptual framework of the War on Poverty and a sug-
gested approach to this massive governmental effort, see Cahn & Cahn, The War on
Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L. J. 1317 (1964). The literature on the poverty
problem in America includes BAGDIKIAN, IN THE MIDST OF PLENTY: POVERTY IN AMERCA
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As a general thesis, Michael Harrington postulates and dramatically dem-
onstrates in THE OTHER AMERICA 2 the existence of a separate poverty subcul-
ture in our society, unaffected by welfare legislation and private charity:
... there are some tens of millions of Americans who are beyond the welfare
state. Some are simply not covered by social legislation: they are omitted from
Social Security and from minimum wage. Others are covered, but since they are
so poor they do not know how to take advantage of the opportunities, or else
their coverage is so inadequate as not to make a difference.3
Broadening this thesis to include general legislation which is beyond the
reach of the poor, it is the hypothesis of this writer that the members of the
"economic underworld" described by Mr. Harrington are not being given
the basic protections afforded to buyers by existing commercial laws. This
condition obtains because of the ignorance on the part of the "poor"4 of the
means of redress available through the courts and the administrative and wel-
fare agencies and also because of loopholes in existing credit-regulation laws
which have been extended and applied in judicial decisions. Of course, the
study of installment credit is only one of many areas in which this hypoth-
esis might be tested. Thus, this paper will attempt to show that in the area of
installment sales among low-income consumers: 1. economic, social and psy-
chological factors make the business of extending credit to the poor a profit-
able low-risk business venture; 2. the existing legislation and court doctrine
is inadequate to protect the interests of the poor; 3. the poor lack knowledge
of their fundamental legal rights as consumers and of the means of redress
currently available through legal aid and other socio-legal agencies; and 4.
as a consequence of this exclusion from the legal framework of our society,
(1964); CONANT, SLUMS AND SUBURBS (1961); CONFERENCE ON ECONOMIC PROGRESS, Washing-
ton, D. C.; POVERTY AND DEPRIVATION IN THE UNITED STATES: THE PLIGHT OF Two FIFTHS
OF THE NATION (1962); ELIAS, GILLIES & RIEMER (ed.), METROPOLIS: VALUES IN CONFLICT
(1964); HANDLIN, THE NEWCOMERS (1959); HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA (1962);
HUMPHREY, WAR ON POVERTY (1964); HUNTER, THE SLUMS (1964); MAY, THE WASTED
AMERICANS (1964); MILLER, RICH MAN, POOR MAN (1964); MORGAN, DAVID, COHEN & BRAzER,
INCOME AND WELFARE IN THE UNITED STATES (1962). The above titles are extracted from a
bibliography prepared by Gary Bellow of the United Planning Organization, Washington,
D.C.
2 HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA (1962).
81d. at 171 (Emphasis added).
' Definitions of poverty are many and varied. Recently conducted government and private
studies of poverty have agreed on a figure of $3,000 per year for a family and $1,500 a year
for an unattached individual as the income figure which is a realistic "dividing line" be-
tween "poverty" and adequate income status. See, e.g., KEYSERLING (CONFERENCE ON Eco-
NOMIC PROGRESS), PROGRESS OR POVERTY 17-18 (1964), and speech of Sargent Shriver to
Woman's National Democratic Club, April 29, 1964, reported in The Washington Post,
April 30, 1964, p. Cl, col. 1. That this income figure is conservative is attested to by the
allowance for food in a budget at this income level-23 cents per meal per person-which
allows a diet primarily consisting of potatoes, cereals, bread, and dry beans. Such a diet
produces the personal appearance described by Michael Harrington as "fat with hunger."
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the low-income consumer obtains less value in goods for his dollar than the
average consumer, thereby aggravating and perpetuating his poverty status.
II. INCIDENCE OF INSTALLMENT BUYING IN AMERICA
That consumer credit has achieved a significant place in the American econ-
omy is a fact that hardly requires demonstration. Figures released by the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in August of 1965 show
that the non-real-estate consumer debt of the American public totals $79.8
billion, that this amount has increased at the rate of $0.5 billion monthly in
a consistent pattern since 1961, and that after leveling off in the first quarter
of 1965, it has increased $3.8 billion in the three months of the second quarter
of 1965. 5 Of the total consumer debt, $62 billion, or almost three-fourths, con-
sists of payments due on installment purchases. Non-installment credit, con-
sisting of single payment loans, charge accounts, and other "service" credit,
has been comparatively constant since 1961, whereas installment credit has
accounted for almost all of the $0.5 billion annual growth of consumer cred-
it.6
For the second quarter of 1965 the disposable personal income of the Amer-
ican people was measured at $455.3 billion, of which $423.0 billion was actu-
ally expended for goods and services.7 These figures show that almost one-
fifth of all sales involve some form of credit and that about 15 per cent involve
the use of the installment plan. And the trend, dependent on the continuance
of the optimistic atmosphere of a thriving economy which has obtained since
1961, shows an increasing reliance on the now-institutionalized American
Way-"easy credit."
Increased use of consumer credit reflects the changing nature of the goods
available in our society. Credit is rarely used for the everyday purchases such
as food and clothing. The expansion of the durable goods market preceded
the credit economy boom.8 Automobiles, television sets, stereo phonographs,
refrigerators, washers, and other household appliances have ceased to be lux-
ury items in our affluent society. The availability of credit brings these items
within the reach of poverty-level consumers-whether they can afford them or
not.
III. IMPACT OF INSTALLMENT BUYING ON POVERTY- INCOME GROUPS
Further dissection of the data on credit buying reveals what our knowledge
of the extent of poverty in America implies: the institution of installment
5 FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 1152
(August 1965).
Ibid.7 Id. at 1167.
' See PHILLIPS, CONSUMER ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 44-45 (1957), and see generally, KATONA,
THE POWERFUL CONSUMER (1960).
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buying has not bypassed the large segment of our society classified as "poor."9
While up-to-date studies of the income distribution of installment buyers are
lacking, a 1960 survey of consumer finance discloses the following data:
The incidence of installment debt is closely related to income. The peak inci-
dence occurs in the classes closest to the BLS maintenance level, which are prob-
ably most conscious of their economic life. In early 1960, 25 per cent of those in
the $0-$2,000 class, 60 per cent of those in the $5,000-$7,500, and 46 per cent of
those in the $10,000-and-over class had some installment debt. The low-income
spending units going into debt are much more likely to commit a large portion
of the income-40 per cent or more-to installment payments. In the much more
numerous quarter of spending units that pledged 10 to 39 per cent of their in-
comes in 1960 to meet payments, the middle-income classes predominate.
... the lowest income tenth is by far the most committed in relation to income,
a reflection of its need to exploit credit to keep body and soul together. 10
A phenomenon related to the growing use of credit among low-income
individuals is the increased use of individual bankruptcy by those who be-
come so entrenched in installment debts and harrassed by creditors that bank-
ruptcy is an acceptable solution. Data released by the Administrative Offices
of the U. S. courts reveal that 163,413 individual bankruptcies were filed dur-
ing the most recent year, and that individual bankruptcies comprised almost
90% of total bankruptcies filed in that year." While these figures include mid-
dle-income families, studies in Flint, Michigan show that the median income
of bankrupts who filed in Flint was $4,656.12
Although data in this area are incomplete, the borders of the problem
emerge clearly enough-low-income groups make extensive use of credit facil-
ities which appear to be readily available to them regardless of their "poor
risk" status. More important, when a poverty-ridden family turns to credit to
make ends meet or to add some light to a dreary life, it, in effect, "sells its
soul" to the finance company in terms of the size of its payments relative to its
already meager income. This is the tragedy of the situation. The low-income
family pledges 40 per cent or more of its income to installment payments for
OIt is submitted that the same phenomenon being discussed-the use of credit by low-
income consumers-has been noted indirectly by many observers of the social scene who
have optimistically misinterpreted it as signifying a leveling of the distribution of income
and the movement of America into a "classless society." See REISMAN, THE LONELY CROWD
286 (1953). What has been observed is really just a leveling of consumption caused by the
easy accessibility of credit. The income figures do not support the thesis that we have under-
gone a commensurate leveling of income. See KOLKO, WEALTH AND POWER IN AMERICA
111-112 (1962), MILLER, RICH MAN, POOR MAN (1964).
10 KOLKO, supra note 9 at 105-106 (Emphasis added). More complete data is necessary in
this statistical area. For a picture of the saving and "dissaving" habits of the rich and poor,
see SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 210 (1964).
" ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT (1965).
2 DOLPHIN, AN ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC AND PERSONAL FACTORS LEADING To CONSUMER
BANKRUPTCY (1965).
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goods which are at the fringe of the luxury-necessity line. To meet the pay-
ment obligations the family must either forego some of the necessities of life
or else default on payments and lose the benefit of the merchandise, usually
without significantly altering its repayment obligations. Needless to say, the
poor do not receive full benefit for their dollar in this process, even in the
unlikely event that quality merchandise is obtained in the purchase.
The automobile purchase is a typical example of the type of credit pur-
chase made by the low-income consumer. While the car has in many cases
become a "necessity" item in many suburban communities, it more often is
appropriately classified as a luxury for the urban-centered low-income family
with public transportation at its disposal. As such, it is not necessary to sus-
tain the individual or his family and would not be part of a rationally-planned
budget placing primary emphasis on the subsistence items of food, shelter,
and clothing. Yet its attractiveness lies in its very irrationality. 13 It is an escape
from the boredom of poverty and provides the prestige-deprived low-
income consumer with a status symbol, allowing him to partake, however
marginally, in the affluence of our "Great Society." The extent to which this
explanation reflects the subconscious motivation of the consumer is amply
portrayed by the datum that "in 1959, 23 per cent of those earning less than
$1,000 owned a car." 14 As a substantially-priced item in most instances, the
percentage of the purchaser's income committed to car payments is high
I George Katona would dismiss this charge of irrationality as totally unfounded in con-
sumer psychology. He finds installment buying, even at high interest rates to be rational
and understandable:
Two major practices of present-day American consumers ...sometimes cited as proof
of irrationality, are well motivated and understandable. One of these, buying on in-
stallment and paying high interest charges even though cash is available or could be
accumulated fairly soon ...may be called "superrational" rather than irrational; it
appears that many consumers take their own shortcomings into account (namely, that
they would not save money if they were not pressured to save). KATONA, supra note 8
at 148.
Mr. Katona, however, does not appear to consider the low-income consumer who purchases
on time goods which he can never afford in a realistic view of his future income prospects,
and who must make future payments out of money which would rationally (or "super-
rationally") be budgeted for subsistence items. It appears from this and many other state-
ments in Mr. Katona's interdisciplinary study of consumer problems that the poverty-level
consumer's economic strength is not potent enough to merit consideration in a study of the
aspirations and motivations of the "powerful consumer." Yet the low-income consumer ap-
pears to be subject to many of the same social forces which motivate higher income groups.
But what is rational in one case may not be so in the other. A study of the motivations of
the less powerful consumer, following the format of Mr. Katona's work, is essential to an un-
derstanding of the field and the lack of such an intensive study is a severe handicap. Mr.
Katona, for the most part, has dismissed the problems of the low-income consumer with
statements like "for the most part low-income people have no assets on which to draw and
no credit on which to borrow." Id. at 102. He thereby ignores a thriving class of merchants,
eager to extend credit to the "poor risks" on the basis of psychological and legal pressures
available to enforce payment, so graphically described by David Caplovitz in THE POOR
PAY MORE (1963). This is an area in which further research is necessary.
141Id. at 123.
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among the low-income groups. Car payments necessarily absorb a large por-
tion of the budget of a low-income family.
IV. THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEM IN A NUTSHELL
The consumer does not create this spectre of payments, defaults, and repos-
sessions. Economic and psychological pressures contribute largely (and auto-
matically) to the existence and perpetuation of such a structure. The Amer-
ican economic system depends entirely on the generation and regeneration of
demand within itself.15 A growing economy requires that a large percentage
of the consumer's available income be used to purchase goods immediately.
This is even more important than the need for investment. Demand for goods
provides the incentive-the profit motive-for capitalists to produce a given
item. The starting point of the now-established cycle is demand for goods.
And stimulation or "creation" of demand through advertising, easy credit
and other high pressure sales techniques is a necessary outgrowth of this need
for a high propensity to consume. As concisely stated by George Katona, con-
sumer economics expert of the Survey Research Center at the University of
Michigan:
Demand depends both on ability to buy and on willingness to buy. Fluctua-
tions of demand, whether by consumers or by business firms, may originate in
changes either in the former or in the latter. It goes without saying that nobody
can buy if he has no income, assets, or credit.' 6
Consumption is further stimulated by the availability of credit. When the
consumer does not have to save cash until he accumulates enough for a par-
ticular purchase, he is more apt to make that purchase. The need of merchants
to insure purchasing power is greatest in the area of the higher-priced dur-
able goods such as automobiles and appliances. The availability of credit
allows consumers to buy these articles without a savings process which re-
moves money from the economy for a substantial period of time. Thus, the
availability of credit makes it easy for the consumer to fulfill his vital role in
the economy. The excess of credit purchases over repayments in a given peri-
od-over-spending or dissaving-has the same effect on the economy as a com-
mensurate increase in income.'
7
25See PHILLIPS, CONSUMER ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 33-34 (1957), also, on the necessity of in-
creasing consumer demand see GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 139-151 (1958).
11 KATONA, supra note 8 at 3.
17 Of course, in the long run, credit does not increase consumption in the economy as a
whole because the items bought on credit today must be paid for tomorrow. However, con-
sumption of major durables is stimulated by the availability of credit at the expense of
consumption in another segment of the overall market for consumer goods. In terms of the
individual low-income consumer, the "substituted" demand is most graphic: major dur-
[Vol. XV
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Looking at the individual entrepreneur, we find that the profit motive
explained above is not just a vague theory of macroeconomics but is mean-
ingful to the neighborhood merchant. The local appliance dealer finds that
by offering easy credit terms he is able to move his merchandise much more
quickly. His sales potential is augmented by all those consumers who can af-
ford to buy only on credit. He makes sales which ordinarily would not be di-
rected to the durable goods market. And he gleans a substantial profit from
the credit transaction either by maintaining his own credit outlet or by ob-
taining a rebate ("pack") from the finance company.18 And experience has
shown him that the risk is not great.19 If necessary, he can discount the install-
ment note and obtain the cash immediately, and this appears to be the gen-
eral practice.20 In either event he has found that the risk involved in such
ables are purchased instead of non-durable necessity items such as food and clothing. Thus,
credit stimulates consumption within a specific industry or a specific store for a specific
type of product. See CAMPBELL, THE CONSUMER INTEREST 284 (1949) and WYAND, THE Eco-
NOMICS OF CONSUMPTION 46-47 (1937).
"s described by Cohen and Hanson, the "pack":
is an amount arbitrarily added by an automobile dealer to the normal authorized
finance charge called for by the finance company. It is kicked back to the car dealer by
the finance company when the car buyer has made his last payment. The swollen
finance charge is paid by the installment purchaser who does not know that it is more
than he needs to pay for credit and who also does not know that later the finance
company will pay (kick) back the extra charge (pack) to the dealer. COHEN & HANSON,
PERSONAL FINANCE .... reproduced in Hearings on S. 1740 Before a Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. at 677 (1961). [Here-
inafter cited as 1961 Hearings].
A recent analysis of the testimony gleaned from hearings of the California Corporations
Commissioner on the application of Sears Roebuck for a license to enter the automobile
loan field appears in 30 CONSUMER REPORTS 258 (May 1965). Significantly, the testimony of
car dealers showed a marked preference for the credit sale over the cash sale based on the
following reasoning:
The amount of profit to be made from selling cars on time depends, in large part, on
the opportunities offered for manipulating charge-or making a "package" as they
say in the trade. A package consists of trade-in, insurance, and finance rates. Id. at 259.
This same hearing reveals the particular consideration given to the low-income con-
sumer, for whom the price is "adjusted" as follows:
In auto salesrooms, the charge is an inverse of the ability to pay-the lower the ability,
the higher the price. This too was freely admitted by the dealers. There was, in fact,
a good deal of testimony from both dealers and lenders about the amount of poor
risk credit they extended. Nevertheless, the dealers, in particular, made it plain that
they preferred the gamble of extending credit to the assurance of selling cars for cash.
The gamble, of course, is not great. The car can always be repossessed to serve as a
lure to another, and still higher-cost, credit deal. Id. at 259 (Emphasis added).
" See note 18, supra. See also COHEN & HANSON, supra note 18, at 682 in which the follow-
ing observation is made: "Nevertheless, the installment contract usually so binds and ties
the customer that losses are very low, less than one half of 1 per cent of total sales."
20 The figures can be derived from the data furnished by the Federal Reserve Board.
Suffice it to say that approximately 85 per cent of the installment credit outstanding is held
by commercial banks, sales finance companies and other financial institutions. FEDERAL
RESERVE BULLETIN, supra note 5 at 1152-1153. See also, Hare v. General Contract Purchase
Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d. 973 (1952). In this case, the Supreme Court of Arkansas,
as one of the factors in determining whether an installment sale was a time sale or a loan
for purposes of the usury statute, found as a fact "the seller increased his cash price with
1965]
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transactions, especially if he limits his credit transactions to residents of the
neighborhood, are largely mythical. In addition to increased sales, he can
make a tidy profit on the credit transaction. All in all, the incentives to sell-
ing on credit are present even in the slum neighborhood setting and the risk
is minimal.
The individual's motivation for using credit generally falls into one of
these categories: convenience, a desire for an improved standard of living,
and necessity.2 1 The convenience motive usually finds expression in charge
account buying or other means of deferred payment where the transaction
is completed within a short period of time by a lump sum payment. Use of
credit out of necessity generally takes the form of debt consolidation or other
forms of cash loans to meet a crisis. Primarily, however, the consumer, espe-
cially the low-income consumer, uses installment credit to improve his stand-
ard of living.
In summary, we have painted the picture of an economy dependent on
demand stimulation and dedicated to inducing all consumers to want to buy
more and more goods. And the merchant and the finance company are easily
drawn to the poor neighborhood-they can make money there. The entire
economic structure promotes the use of credit, even by those who cannot af-
ford it. Coupled with the already strong and well-documented tendency of
the consumer to spend a large portion of his income, 22 the credit economy
promotes a higher rate of consumption. The natural propensity to consume 23
provides fertile ground for the credit salesman to plant the idea of buying
on credit.
These fundamental economic concepts take on added significance in the
low-income stratum of our society. At the subsistence level, the natural pro-
pensity to consume, without extraordinary outside stimulus, is higher than
at other income levels and generally exceeds the income of the consumer. 24
Relatively little, if any, saving is accomplished, and a high proportion of in-
come is utilized for the basic necessities of food, shelter, and clothing. In many
cases, the low-income family engages in dissaving by borrowing money, buy-
ing on credit, or depleting its savings.
Despite this already high propensity to consume, the low-income family
the reasonable assurance that he could . . . discount the paper to . . . [an] individual or
finance company." Id. at 978.
1 BECKMAN, MAYNARD, & DAVIDSON, PRINCIPLES OF MARKETING, ch. 26, reproduced in
1961 Hearings, supra note 18, at 653.
See generally PHILLIPS, supra note 15, at 10, 34 (1957).
2 For a general treatment of the propensity to consume the reader is referred to SAMUEL-
SON, supra note 10, at 210-219 (1964).
24 According to Samuelson's figures, the propensity to consume of all families with an
income of $5,000 is at least 100 per cent, with families in the $3,000 and $4,000 annual
income bracket tending to spend more than their income. Id. at 210.
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is exposed to the lure of buying on time. Psychologically, the low-income con-
sumer has a greater tendency to heed the call of "easy credit." His prospects
for improving his income status, however, are extremely low as compared to
his middle-class counterpart. Low-income wage earners, and especially the
unemployed recipient of public welfare, have little chance of breaking out
of the "hard-core" pocket of poverty.25 Unlike the middle-income consumer,
therefore, the low-income wage earner is not realistic when he justifies his
debt purchases by the optimistic assumption that his income is on the rise.
In most cases, our prosperity and rising income levels have not affected the
lower income brackets. Yet, our low-income consumer does buy on time with
considerable frequency. The motivation, to a great extent, lies in the fact
that his value as a breadwinner has become suspect over the years, both in
his own eyes and those of his family, and his self-respect is constantly under
stress.26 By the same token, he sees that more successful members of society
measure their success and prestige by the quality of their material goods, es-
pecially their cars.2 7 When a salesman or a newspaper ad informs him that
he can have the same type of car for $1 down with "easy monthly payments,"
he (or his wife) becomes an eager customer. Even though he cannot afford
to be a Cadillac owner, his natural striving for self-respect and esteem in the
eyes of his family and friends may well blind him to the practical economics
of the situation. The car-or television or stereo-helps to compensate for his
other failures. 28 This phenomenon, observed by David Caplovitz in his study
of the consumer problems of inhabitants of low-cost housing projects in Man-
hattan, is well described by the shorthand phrase "compensatory consump-
tion."29
In short, the problem can be seen as a concurrence in time and space of a
merchant eager to sell unnecessary goods to low-income buyers equally eager
An excellent portrayal of the stickiness of the web of poverty is given in HARRINGTON,
supra note 2. Generally, poverty is in-bred, being passed on from generation to generation
together with an attitude of frustration and despair which becomes instilled early in life
in the children of the poor. Lack of decent education, training, diet, and satisfying achieve-
ments help to perpetuate poverty in its hereditary cycle.
'C APLOVITZ, supra note 13, at 12.
SPHILLIPS, supra note 15, at 7-8.
2sAs aptly described by David Caplovitz:
The popular image of the American as striving for the material possessions which
bestow on him comfort and prestige in the eyes of his fellow does not hold only for the
ever-increasing middle class. The cultural pressures to buy major durables reach low- as
well as middle-income families. In some ways consumption may take on more sig-
nificance for low-income families than for those in the higher classes. Since many have
small prospect of greatly improving their low social standing through occupational mo-
bility, they turn to consumption as one sphere in which they can make some progress
toward the American dream of success. CAPLOVrrZ, supra note 13, at 12-13.
'Ibid. Vance Packard notes this same phenomenon when he states:
Although people in the lower social brackets do not seem to strive particularly hard to
get into a higher social layer, they can be persuaded, merchandisers have learned, to
move up their consumption. PACKARD, THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS (1957).
1965]
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to buy. This meeting of the minds and purses is strongly supported by the
existing economic structure and consumer psychology. Only a modification
of one or both will serve to alleviate the evils which arise out of the encounter.
V. UNFAIR SALES PRACTICES
We now turn to an investigation into the actual practices which occur in the
confrontation between consumer and merchant. It is the thesis of this article
that the existing legal structure is inadequate to cope with the imaginative
practices of merchants who prey on the lack of legalistic savvy and resources
of the low-income consumer.
Legislation among the states has traditionally been directed toward the
control of interest charges. A majority (about 27) of the states have such re-
tail installment laws in effect, 30 establishing a ceiling on permissible interest
charges that is usually somewhat higher than the limits of the general usury
laws and lower than the limits of the small loan laws. A small minority of
states require that the terms of an installment sale be incorporated in a writ-
ten contract which contains an itemized list of the cash price, the interest
charges, and any other service fees. Sanctions embodied in this type of leg-
islation have occasionally included licenses for finance companies and crim-
inal penalties; more often, the laws rely on ordinary civil remedies.31
Regulation of unfair sales practices has been traditionally a matter of
state initiative. The Federal Trade Commission has, however, entered the
field to a certain extent, principally in the area of false advertising, under
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act 32 which authorizes the FTC
to curb unfair and deceptive acts and practices and unfair methods of com-
petition in interstate commerce. The FTC has also promulgated rules de-
signed to control installment credit practices in the automobile industry, by
including in the definition of an unfair trade practice the failure of the
seller of an automobile to furnish the buyer, prior to the sale, with a written
statement of the terms of the sale, including finance charges, insurance costs
and other charges.3 3 Disclosure of the manufacturer's suggested retail price
20 See CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION (1965). See also Hogan, A Survey
of State Retail Installment Sales Legislation, 44 CORNELL L. Q. (1958); Mors, Recent Trends
in State Regulation of Installment Credit, JOURNAL OF FINANCE (1960), Symposium on Con-
sumer Credit, 55 Nw. U. L. REV. 301, 317 (1960).
0155 Nw. U. L. REV. 403-418 (1960).
0238 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964). See also 52 Stat. 114 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 52
(1964) for the proscription of false advertising.
16 C.F.R. §§ 197.1-.5 (Supp. 1957). See also for a statement of Commissioner Paul Dixon
and a reproduction of the FTC regulations of advertising practices in the automobile in-
dustry as well as the complaints issued in four cases, 1961 Hearings, supra note 18, at 18-31.
Recent reports of the Commission reflect the inadequacy of existing remedies. As gleaned
from the information furnished in the report, the only credit-related activity of the Com-
mission during 1963 involved "advertising of 'debt consolidation services'." FTC ANN. REP.
[Vol. XV
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is required by the Automobile Information Disclosure Act.3 4
Other Federal activity has been proposed by Senator Douglass5 and others
in the form of a "Truth in Lending" bill, but attempts to enact such a bill
have fallen before the staunch opposition of a powerful lobby which included
the retail merchants and bankers. Such a bill would require the seller to fur-
nish the buyer with an itemized statement of the cash price less trade-in, serv-
ice charges, the amount to be financed, finance charges, and a simple annual
interest rate on the unpaid balance.
Of course, all the traditional buyer's remedies are available to the purchas-
er on the installment plan, if he is astute enough to demand his rights. There
is no remedy for a buyer who pays much more than the value of an item or who
fails to return defective merchandise. In other words the existing legal struc-
ture does not, it is submitted, operate to protect the low-income consumer
from flagrant abuses of both legal and moral principles by neighborhood
merchants.
The most blatant, and legal means of evading usury and other commercial
laws lies in the pricing of the product. Small neighborhood appliance stores
are not in competition with discount houses in the out-lying areas; the low-
income consumer, for the most part, does his business in the neighborhood.
These merchants can charge exorbitant prices for inferior goods and still at-
tract the low-income inhabitant of the neighborhood. By marking up his
price sufficiently above cost, the storekeeper can provide "easy credit" at a
legal interest rate. Of course part of the "real" interest rate is hidden in the
cost of the goods, but it does not appear that a court would apply the usury
law to such a transaction. Even the most liberal courts require that a "cash
price" comparison be obtained by the seller before the differential between
a "cash price" and a "time price" becomes significant.36 And this is highly un-
likely to be the case where the buyer because of his economic circumstances
11-13 (1963). During this period, about $4 million was spent by the FTC "to halt the cheat-
ing of consumers, principally by false advertising." The 1964 report discloses a somewhat
more extensive consideration of the unfair credit practices described above. In the area of
home improvement and repair products the commission investigated "bait and switch tac-
tics, fictitious 'regular' prices, misleading guarantees, misrepresentation of interest rates...."
FTC ANN. REP. (1964). Only $4.4 million was spent for investigation and litigation in con-
sumer-related activities, with $1 million of that total directed to the textile and fur industry.
Id. at 41. Considering the broad spectrum of activities over which the FTC has potential
regulatory power, it is apparent that the FTC appropriations are patently inadequate to cope
with the widespread, multi-industry deceptive credit practices of merchants. The history of
FTC regulation, as discussed above, supports this proposition, confirming the writer's im-
pression that any Federal action in the field has been haphazard.
,115 U.S.C. §§ 1231-1233 (1964).
On July 12, 1965, Senator Paul Douglas (D. Ill.) renewed his proposal for "Truth in
Lending" legislation. S. 2275, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1965).
'" See, e.g., Hare v. General Contract Purchase Co., supra note 20; Daniel v. First National
Bank, 227 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1955); Beatty v. Franklin Investment Co., 115 App. D.C. 311,
319 F.2d 712 (1963).
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never considers the possibility of buying in cash. An example of the price
mark-up as a technique of the credit merchants is documented by David Cap-
lovitz in his New York study. There it was found that the median price paid
for a television was $275, with 77 per cent of the 313 families who had bought
sets paying over $200. Breaking these figures down, it was found that the
lower-income families more often paid a higher price for television sets, pho-
nographs, and washing machines. Also, the study showed that low-income
consumers who shopped primarily at neighborhood stores paid more for those
items than low-income consumers with a shopping pattern which extended
beyond the neighborhood and involved shopping at discount houses and
chain stores.3 7 This most simple device is probably the most pernicious due
to the facility with which it is practiced within the circle of the neighborhood
and because of its absolute legality. Prospective remedies will be discussed as
part of overall proposals.
Overpricing of goods to disguise an interest charge is only one means
of obtaining the same result. In a credit transaction, the seller can hide the
interest charges, and thereby comply with the already generous retail install-
ment and/or small loan regulation of interest rates, by including the interest
charge in any of the other charges incidental to such a transaction. These in-
clude insurance costs, brokerage fees, credit investigation charges, loan pro-
curement charges, attorneys' fees, bonuses, commissions, and myriad other
charges.38 While "Truth in Lending" legislation may, if it can be effectively
enforced, eliminate many of these devices, it would not remove the price mark-
up as a device for camouflaging interest charges. Likewise, it is doubtful
that such legislation would pierce these disguises of the interest rate. In any
event it is doubtful that disclosure of the interest rate rules would provide
any meaningful protection to the low-income consumer who, even in the un-
likely event that he reads the contract of sale, has little of the bargaining pow-
er or skill necessary to obtain better terms.
The above is by no means an exhaustive catalogue of deceptive practices
in the area of interest charges. The seller also has at his disposal the general
lack of understanding among the public as to the nature of interest. There
is a vast and little understood difference between the interest rate on the un-
paid balance and the interest rate computed from a constant base. The de-
clining balances method of computation results in interest charges, generally
referred to as "true" interest, which are approximately half those of the fixed
balance method,3 9 using the same rate and same initial principal. Likewise,
17 CAPLOVITZ, supra note 13 at 82-93.
8 For a partial catalogue of these practices, see Meth, A Contemporary Crisis: The Prob-
lem of Usury in the United States, 44 A.B.A.J. 637 (1958). The "truth in lending" 1961
Hearings, supra note 18, are replete with accounts of disguised and misstated interest charges.
See, e.g., pp. 690-692.
As explained by Cohen and Hanson:
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the use of a discount rate rather than a simple interest rate substantially dis-
torts the true interest charges. This is not a problem peculiar to low-income
consumers. Many well-educated middle-class consumers fail to understand
the basic difference between interest rates according to the method of com-
putation.
Often the high-priced neighborhood store supplements the natural tendency
of the consumer to shop in the local store by the use of "bait ads" and the
"switch sale." 40 This technique can best be described by citing an example
encountered by David Caplovitz in his survey:
I saw a TV ad for a $29 sewing machine, so I wrote to the company and they
sent down a salesman who demonstrated it for me. It shook the whole house, but
I wanted to buy it anyway. But he kept saying it would disturb all the neighbors
by being so noisy, and went out to the hall and brought in another model cost-
ing $185 ...
I actually had to pay $220. He promised if I paid within a certain amount of
time I would get $35 back. But since my husband was out of work, we couldn't
pay within the time period, so I didn't get the refund ... I was taken in by the
high-pressure sales talk.4 '
The essential elements of this widespread sales technique are (1) advertise-
ment of goods at a substantially reduced price, (2) disparagement of the ad-
vertised good as inferior and below the taste of the prospective buyer, and (3)
demonstration and high-pressure sale of higher priced goods in the same line.
One need only follow up the furniture ads in the local Sunday supplement
to attest to the commonplace nature of this sales technique.
A deviation from the "bait ad" is the allurement of the customer through
advertisement of "easy credit terms," "low bank rates," or "no charge for in-
terest." 42 The slogan "dollar down and dollar a week" also occurs frequently
in auto ads. When the prospective customer is lured into the dealer's show-
room, he finds out that the credit terms are considerably more onerous.43
Another device of the credit merchants which flagrantly plays on the igno-
rance of the consumer is a pure and simple misstatement of the cost of the
merchandise. The seller quotes one price and inserts another into the con-
tract. This can be accomplished by having the customer sign a blank con-
When installment sellers, who are to be repaid in equal installments, state their
charge ... as a percentage of the total unpaid balance at the start, since this balance is
reduced by installment payments, the average balance outstanding during the term of
the installment contract is only about half the original unpaid balance. Therefore, the
true rate, in the absence of other manipulations and distortions, when payments are
spread over a year, is roughly twice the stated rate. Id. at 689.
40 CAPLovrrz, supra note 13, at 142-143; BLACK, BuY Now, PAY LATER 140-142 (1961).
4AId. at 142-143. (Emphasis in original).
"Advertisements such as these led to complaints by the FTC in 1959 of unfair and decep-
tive trade practices. 1961 Hearings, supra note 18 at 24-31.
8Ibid.
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tract 44 or by filling in the higher amount in the contract with the hope that it
will not be noticed. 45
Caplovitz also reports that merchants are not reluctant to substitute used
merchandise for the showroom item which the customer thinks he has pur-
chased. 46 These and other obviously illegal practices depend on the timidity
of the consumer and the temerity of the salesman for their successful perpe-
tration. Yet the available evidence indicates that these practices are not un-
common.
Another wide-spread technique designed to give the seller added security
for the installment sale is the revolving account coupled with a clause in the
conditional sales agreement allowing the seller to repossess all the merchan-
dise purchased on the account if there is a default on any payment regard-
less of the extent to which the balance has been reduced.47
In a recent case a woman on relief with seven children to support (whose
financial status and source of income was known to the seller) made pur-
chases from a furniture store in 1957 and continued to make such purchases
until 1962 at which time she had purchased almost $1300 worth of goods and
had paid all except $164.00. In 1962 she bought a stereo priced at $514.95
and shortly thereafter the furniture store sought to repossess all of the items
purchased from 1957 to 1962, citing a clause in the contract by which the
seller retained title to all goods sold until the account was closed.48
A device which has frequently been observed by the author during his work
"COHEN & HANSON, supra note 18, at 682. See also CONSUMER REPORTS, supra note 18;
Black, supra note 40, at 137-140.
,1 Several shocking examples of this practice are cited by CAPLOVITZ, supra note 12, at 147.
41Id. at 150-153.
'7 COHEN & HANSON, supra note 18, at 682.
"Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., No. 18,604, U.S. Court of Appeals (D.C.
Cir. August 11, 1965). In its decision, the Court ruled that the contract should be subject
to the following test of unconscionability:
Did each party to the contract, considering his obvious education or lack of it, have
a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the contract, or were the im-
portant terms hidden in a maze of fine print and minimized by deceptive sales prac-
tices? Id. at 6-7.
In addition, the Court laid down a general rule of unconscionability which was defined
as "an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract
terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party." Id. at 6.
This decision marks a breakthrough into judicial investigation of the bargaining rela-
tionship of parties to installment contracts with the view toward unenforceability of op-
pressive clauses which, if generally applied, would rule out many of the deceptive practices
described in this article.
Under the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, courts have been given explicit authorization to
use the "unconscionable contract" approach in dealing with contracts of sale. Section 2-302
provides:
1. If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have
been unconscionable at the time it was made, the court may refuse to enforce the con-
tract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause,
or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any uncon-
scionable result.
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at the Neighborhood Legal Services Project in Washington, D. C. is the sale
of defective merchandise or the sale of merchandise with a promise to service
the product and subsequent departure from the jurisdiction without satisfy-
ing any complaints or service requests. The buyer finds that his promissory
note has been transferred to a finance company insulated from the defense
of failure of consideration by the legal protection afforded to a holder in due
course.
49
The catalogue of these practices could continue endlessly. The unscrupu-
lous merchant appears able to practice such frauds on the unknowing con-
sumer almost at will. The supply of unscrupulous merchants seems closely
linked to the demand of the low-income consumer for prestige goods he can-
not afford. The unequal terms of the encounter do not allow us to dismiss
the problem with a perfunctory "caveat emptor." Some form of control is es-
sential.
VI. REMEDIAL PROPOSALS
A. Judicial solutions
Many legal defenses are available to the low-income consumer who refuses
to continue payments on his installment contract and is sued. Traditional
buyers' remedies which may be invoked include fraud in the inducement,
lack of genuine consent, failure of consideration, usury, inadequacy of con-
sideration, unconscionability of terms, 50 and failure to comply with a regu-
latory statute.
Several conditions, however, must be satisfied prior to successful assertion
of these defenses. First, the low-income consumer needs legal representation
for the effective presentation of his legal defenses in the complex field of com-
mercial law. Legal services available to the indigent defendant in civil cases,
such as Legal Aid or Neighborhood Legal Services, generally are beyond the
reach of those who need them simply because of ignorance of the existence
of such services. 51 Second, assuming that the defendant in such a case knows
how to obtain legal services, he must have a desire to consult a lawyer. It is
a well-known fact to lending agencies that judges and lawyers are relatively
poor credit risks,52 due to their knowledge of legal defenses to unenforceable
contracts and their capacity to assert a defense. The low-income consumer,
1 For an example of this type of dealing, see Russell v. Universal Acceptance Corp., No.
3656 (D.C.Ct. of App., June 16, 1965). In this case, the D.C. Court of Appeals refused to apply
the rule of Beatty v. Franklin Investment Co., supra note 36, despite a strikingly similar
fact situation clouded only by the use of a "reserve fund" as a cloak for thinly-disguised
finance charges in the amount of 55 per cent of the base price.
50 See note 48, supra.
ta See DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, THE
EXTENSION OF LEGAL SERVICES To THE POOR 64-65 (1964).
5 BLACK, supra note 40, at 50-51.
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on the other hand, is unaware of these possible defenses and feels an obliga-
tion to pay the contractual amount.53 Thus, he may prejudge his case, decide
that the plaintiff is entitled to recover and not oppose the suit.
A fundamental condition for assertion of legal defenses in court is notice
of the proceedings. Failure of service of process on defendants in the lower
courts, which decide a great number of cases, has reached such frequency that
a term has evolved to describe this phenomenon-"sewer service."5 4
Of course, the case may never reach the courts. The buyer may simply pay
the amount called for under the contract without protesting the exorbitant
price or defects in the merchandize or fraudulent sales practices. Unless he
consults a lawyer who advises him to cease making payments, the problem
will never be aired. This result is always in the mind of the neighborhood
merchant who adopts an approach that any complaints can be "settled" am-
icably without resort to lawyers and the courts.55
In addition to these problems of legal assistance, the judicial solution to
deceptive and unfair sales practices has other inadequacies. Use of the above
defenses to a suit on an installment contract frequently requires that an al-
most insurmountable legal obstacle be overcome, the legal doctrine that a
holder in due course of a negotiable instrument takes the instrument free
and clear of all personal defenses which the maker has against the original
holder.56 The shield of this doctrine has become institutionalized by the neigh-
borhood merchant, who often signs a contract with a finance company guar-
anteeing that all promissory notes attached to merchants' conditional sales
contract will be promptly discounted. 57 In many cases the finance company
supplies the dealer with the forms for the conditional sales agreement and the
promissory note and has an unwritten continuing business relationship with
the merchant. 58 It is ordinary practice for the seller to transfer a note im-
mediately to a finance company or bank which discounts the note and pays the
face value to the merchant less an amount euphemistically labelled "dealers
OId. at 53-60. Mr. Black notes that during the depression years 95% of outstanding in-
stallment debts continued to be paid. Id. at 54.
"As depicted by Caplovitz, a common occurrence in New York is as follows:
Instead of finding the defendant, the process server simply throws the summons away.
Low-income families are especially likely to be victims of this practice since they are not
apt to know how to protect their legal rights. Merchants are well aware that judg-
ments by default are common and take advantage of this fact. HEW CONFERENCE PRO-
CEEDINGS, supra note 51, at 66.
51In this author's experience, one merchant gave a client an expensive blanket, asked her
not to consult again with the lawyer from the Neighborhood Legal Services Project, and
told her to write down her complaints without legal assistance.
51 See UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, § 57; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Section
3-305.
67See, e.g., Russell v. Universal Acceptance Corp., supra note 49, at 1-2.
5 Beatty v. Franklin Investment Co., supra note 36; Hare v. General Contract Purchase
Corp., supra note 20.
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reserve" which will be rebated to the merchant if the debt is paid.59 The fi-
nance company thereby obtains independent status as a holder in due course
unless the court scrutinizes the transaction, finds a substantial business rela-
tionship between the merchant and the finance company, and applies the
minority rule of the Hare case 60 or finds that the holder of the note had notice
of defenses available to the maker against the prior holder.
In conclusion, it appears that the contracts of the neighborhood merchant
escape the scrutiny of the courts in most instances due to the lack of legal rep-
resentation among his customers, a lack of desire on the part of his customers
to challenge him in court, or the legal doctrine protecting the holder in due
course of the buyer's promissory note.
In scattered instances, the courts have provided relief from oppressive con-
tracts in behalf of the consumer by avoiding the holder in due course doc-
trine, as in Beatty6' and Hare02 or by applying the traditional 63 doctrine of
unconscionability to installment sales contracts. 64 These judicial remedies
to the unfair sales practices of neighborhood merchants have a limited range
of effectiveness. The percentage of cases in which buyers successfully assert
legal defenses to an installment contract is not large enough to serve as a de-
terrent to the continuance of such practices. The cost of litigation and the
loss of an occasional contract claim is easily absorbed as a business expense
in this profitable market.
These judicial solutions to the problems of the low-income consumer fail
to reach the essence of the problems. In many instances the poor pay more
because prices in the neighborhood store are excessive or the low-income con-
sumer has so marginal an existence on an unsteady income that he should not
buy on credit. Bankruptcy filings of individuals tend to show the wide-spread
incidence of overextension of debts among low-income individuals. 65
A problem of such wide social impact must look beyond the courts for solu-
tion. Individual miscarriages of justice and social inequity can be redressed
by the courts, but the problem is of such scope that the courts have a minimal
impact. Furthermore as shown by the materials cited in this article, policy
considerations based on sociological, psychological and economic concepts as
well as empirical data furnish the most compelling reasons for a change in
the law. Arguments based on legal precedents divorced from their social con-
5 Russell v. Universal Acceptance Corp., supra note 49.
80 Supra note 36.1Supra note 36. But see Russell, supra note 49.
62 Supra note 20.
See Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3rd Cir. 1948).
Williams v. Walker-Thomas, supra note 48.
Approximately 90% of all bankruptcies filed are under the nonbusiness (i.e. individual)
provisions of the Bankruptcy Act by debtors who are unable to meet the demands of their
many creditors. Comment, The Problem of Consumer Bankruptcy: Is Amendment of the
Bankruptcy Act the Answer, 63 MICH. L. REv. 1449 (1965).
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text are inadequate by themselves to explain and/or rectify abuses in this area.
Courts are not well adapted to sift through the materials necessary for a com-
plete study of the problems, nor is it the nature of a court to develop a broad
set of rules designed to cure a social ill. This is a legislative problem of the
purest form and courts are ill-equipped to take the broad social factors into
consideration in a more than perfunctory manner.
B. Long-range solutions
1. Consumer Education
As a result of several regional conferences conducted recently, the President's
Committee on Consumer Interests, Mrs. Esther Peterson, Chairman, made the
following recommendations for a long-range attack on all consumer problems:
1. that the Office of Education of HEW encourage schools to add consumer
economics to their curricula and stimulate the development of a thorough
literature in the field; 2. that a special committee be established to compile
information and that existing Federal agencies with consumer responsibil-
ities undertake more research and also study methods of improving dissem-
ination; 3. that the Department of Commerce establish a liaison with the bus-
iness community to publish existing performance standards and other infor-
mation about specific products; and 4. that programs be established to con-
sider the need of special groups such as the poor, the elderly, the non-English
speaking and the poorly educated. The breadth of these proposals serves to
demonstrate the enormity of consumer-related problems in the nation as a
whole. In regard to the specific problems discussed in this article, it would
appear that the committee's recommendations, while extremely beneficial
and far-reaching, will only indirectly approach a problem which should be
attacked frontally. It appears illogical to educate the consumer to avoid il-
legal schemes-or at least immoral practices which should be proscribed-
when the fault lies in the failure of society to develop sanctioning measures
which are effective to deter and eliminate the practices themselves. 6
The efforts of the President's Committee coupled with the efforts of neigh-
borhood workers in the community action programs of the War on Poverty
will indeed have a salutary effect on the consumers who receive the educa-
tion and have the available resources for translating sound consumer habits
into practice.
It is naive, however, to assume that such a Utopian society of well-educated
buyers will ever come to pass. To paraphrase John Maynard Keynes, by the
time such a goal is attained, we will all be dead. Education will have an im-
pact and will tend to improve conditions, but the causes of the problem fol-
11 See PRESIDENT'S COMMITEE ON CONSUMER INTERESTS, REPORT To THE PRESIDENT (March
1965).
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low in the wake of an educational program-teaching the people about pro-
blems does not change the existing conditions.
2. Legal Services
A component of the Community Action Programs of several cities including
Washington, D. C. and Oakland, California, has been a provision for "neigh-
borhood law offices" to supplement existing Legal Aid programs. These proj-
ects, modeled on the framework proposed by Edgar and Jean Cahn,67 are
designed to provide legal assistance, primarily in civil cases, to neighborhood
residents who qualify for such assistance. The availability of a neighborhood
lawyer to act as "house counsel" for the low-income residents should provide
vigorous presentation of available legal defenses for those residents who avail
themselves of this service. The expansion of this program to other cities, as
recently announced by the Office of Economic Opportunity, should have a
dramatic impact on the practices of neighborhood merchants.
The neighborhood lawyer, however, works under the same limitations as
the courts. Traditional judicial doctrines such as the protection of the holder
in due course of an installment note, the enforcement of oppressive clauses
in "contracts of adhesion" despite the buyer's lack of bargaining power, or
the general rule that a court will not question the adequacy of the consider-
ation will prevent an effective attack by the neighborhood lawyer on many
of the practices outlined above.
C. Legislative Solutions
1. State Legislation
Existing and proposed legislation is inadequate to cope with the imaginative
schemes depicted above. The small loan laws, "truth in lending" legislation,
and retail installment sales acts suffer from a common defect. They are not
self-enforcing. Dependent on the initiative of the buyer to invoke them, the
sanctioning effect of these laws is minimal and easily absorbed by the suc-
cessful businessman as an operating cost. A successful merchant can flagrantly
ignore any of these laws in the manner described above and still come out
ahead in the long-run. He may have to pay a nominal fine in the unlikely
event that he is prosecuted for the violation of a regulatory statute or he may
lose several court cases to resourceful lawyers, but these setbacks are insignif-
icant when compared to the overall profitability of ignoring the law.
Licensing laws embody somewhat stricter sanctioning. If merchants engage
in the above-described practices to a significant degree and are detected, in
some states they could be denied a license to engage in the credit business. 68
This sanction, however, is rarely applied. This type of law appears to suffer
Supra, note 1.
' CURRAN, supra note 30.
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from a lack of enforcement due to inadequate investigation into unfair prac-
tices.
A potential solution to the inadequacy of current legislation in many states
is the uniform law currently being drafted by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Such a law would undoubtedly
be more palatable to business interests who have vigorously opposed the entry
of the Federal government into the field of credit regulation as evidenced by
the repeated defeats of Senator Douglas' "Truth in Lending" legislation,
which must be deemed a mild regulatory measure.
There seems to be little dispute as to the constitutional authority of Con-
gress to regulate the credit business to the extent that it affects interstate com-
merce. As stated by Professor Arthur E. Sutherland:
I have little doubt that the Supreme Court of the United States would uphold
this measure [Truth in Lending] as constitutional if Congress were to pass it.
Since 1936, the commerce power of the Congress has been used to control many
local matters which have an effect upon interstate matters, and the commerce
power is fortified by the somewhat nebulous power to control the value of money
under article 1, section 8, clause 5. In August 1963, there were more than $66
billion of consumer credit outstanding in the United States. More than $51 bil-
lion of this consisted of installment credit ... Congress seems clearly to have the
power to regulate this immense volume of credit, which affects every state in the
Union, which has much to do with the prosperity of the entire economy, and
which makes practicable the marketing of automobiles, household equipment
and every other sort of consumer commodity throughout the United States. 69
Professor Sutherland, however, as spokesman for the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, contends that the benefits of uni-
form Federal legislation would be greatly outweighed by the practical prob-
lems which would arise under overlapping Federal-State legislation.
70 This
objection does not seem insoluble. The argument was raised with respect to
Federal legislation in the area of labor-management relations in the 1930's
and the courts have been equal to the task of defining the areas of state and
Federal jurisdiction over union activities. The argument that chaos will re-
sult from Federal legislation overlooks the fact that chaos already exists in
the field of credit regulation.
The approach advocated by Professor Sutherland is the adoption by the
states of uniform legislation designed to cover the entire field of consumer
credit, including installment sales, usury and small loans31 Such an act would,
0OHearing on S. 750 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency, 88th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. at 1035-1036 (1963).
71 Id. at 1036.
7Id. at 1031.
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of course, resolve any doubt as to conflict with existing law; a state adopting
the uniform legislation need only displace existing inconsistent laws.
The problem arising out of this approach is that many of the inadequacies
of existing legislation72 will of necessity be incorporated in the uniform leg-
islation. Lack of effective sanctions due to inadequate investigation of abusive
practices or to lack of prosecutorial resources will not disappear with a change
in substantive rules of law. Nor is it customary to enact penal legislation by
means of a uniform statute or to create a regulatory agency by this means. To
combat the resourcefulness of unscrupulous lenders, it is necessary to go be-
yond the traditional methods which have proved to be unsuccessful.
A further disadvantage of a uniform law is that adoption by states in which
the problem is most acute has no assurance of success. And even adoption
does not insure a "uniform" attack on the problem. Differing interpretations
of the act could lead to widely divergent results and the lack of Federal legis-
lation in the field would operate as a deterrent to Supreme Court concern in
a field which has vital national overtones.
Clearly, a uniform act would be better than the current status of state legis-
lation in random directions. The literature in the field indicates that the prac-
tices in the consumer credit area do not vary widely from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. The same phenomena are reported in the poverty areas of the
large cities throughout the country, and a uniform consumer credit code
would be a sound initial step toward remedy of existing abuses.
2. Federal legislation
Effective regulation of the credit industries with its dramatic impact on na-
tional stability, monetary policy, and distribution of income clearly lies with-
in the ambit of constitutional Federal action. The experiences depicted by
observers of the credit field indicate that novel and far-reaching Federal leg-
islation is essential because of the failure of existing remedies in the states
and the courts to remedy the flagrant practices of some merchants.
While data in many areas is lacking, it is clear from the existing informa-
tion that one of the causes of self-perpetuation of poverty lies in the credit
abuses visited on many of the poverty-stricken citizens. To effectuate one of
the primary national goals, i.e. the eradication of poverty conditions, sweep-
ing legislation is essential.
3. Substantive Proposals
a. Truth in Lending-Proposed Federal legislation in this area has cen-
tered around the "Truth in Lending" bill. In a speech accompanying the in-
troduction of the bill, Senator Douglas explained that his bill would require
creditor to furnish the buyer with a statement of the total finance charge, "in
71 See text accompanying notes 50 to 65.
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dollars and cents," and of the "true annual interest rate" on the outstanding
unpaid balance of the debt. The philosophy of the bill is one of enhancing
the opportunity of the installment purchaser to shop for credit by providing
him with enough information to compare finance charges. As expressed by
Senator Douglas, "Truth in Lending would obviously work to the disadvan-
tage of those who charge an excessively high rate of interest. If we pass this
bill, these firms will either have to lower their rates or face a loss of business
to their competitors. Up to now, these operators have been able to get by with
charging exorbitant rates through confusion or subterfuge." 73
This legislation has been attacked on many fronts in previous sessions of
Congress. Small businessmen have deplored the clerical burden which would
be placed upon them by requiring a statement of the true rate of interest, us-
ing the unpaid balance as a base. For example, a formula for determining
the "true" interest rate, i.e., the amount of interest to be paid on the de-
clining balance of payments due, is as follows:
2 yc
m (n+l)
1 - true interest rate
y = number of payments per year
c = cost of loan
m - money received
n = number of installments74
Yet, proponents of the bill have demonstrated calculators which would allow
easy computation of the interest rate.75
The brunt of the attack on "Truth in Lending" legislation has focused upon
the wisdom of Federal control over the business of consumer credit.
In terms of the subject matter of this paper, the consumer problems of the
low-income segment of our society, the "Truth in Lending" legislation is sub-
stantively inadequate to curb existing "unfair sales practices." As expressed
by the principal proponent of the bill, it is designed to foster competition
among lending institutions and to allow comparative shopping for credit.
Yet, as we have shown above, the neighborhood merchant has a built-in mon-
opoly due to the tendency of low-income purchasers to restrict their "shop-
ping" to the immediate neighborhood. With the current lack of knowledge
among low-income consumers regarding alternative forms of credit, this theo-
retical increase of competition would have little practical impact for the low-
income consumer. The "Truth in Lending" approach presupposes a more
competitive market and a higher level of consumer education than currently
7 United Press International Wire Service, Release No. GE 1155A, July 12, 1965.
"' See 1961 Hearings, supra note 18, at 1131.7 Id. at 158-159, 191-195, 490-496.
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exists in the low-income neighborhood. As such, the approach of Senator
Douglas and the proponents of "Truth in Lending" will have its primary
impact on the middle-income consumer and the more reliable merchant with
whom he does business.
b. Minimal Credit Standards-In the area of suggested legislative solutions
to the problems of low-income consumers, David Caplovitz makes the sug-
gestion that minimal credit requirements be established and that enforcement
of any debt contracted by a consumer who failed to meet these minimal stan-
dards be denied enforcement in the courts, much in the manner that con-
tracts of minors are treated by the courts.7 6 This proposal appears to cut too
deeply, removing the benefits of credit from needy consumers to remedy the
abuses of merchants, whereas the problem lies more in excessive charges for
interest and higher pricing of goods for low-income consumers, as well as mis-
leading advertisements. But for these oppressive practices, credit can benefit
the low-income consumer in many ways. 77
c. Fair Trade to Consumers-At first blush, it would appear that legislation
aimed at limiting the price which a merchant can charge for goods is a sub-
stantial encroachment on time-honored sensibilities such as "freedom of con-
tract" and the "free enterprise" system of pricing which allows the seller to
charge whatever the market will bear and places the burden of determining
the value of goods on the buyer. Yet when one considers existing "fair trade"
laws which allow the manufacturer to place a minimum price on goods, leg-
islative control of the maximum mark-up no longer appears distasteful. Why
pay tribute to a vague concept such as "free enterprise" in one instance and
not in the other?
Survival of the American system of government has depended in the past
on adjustment of traditional concepts to social realities in an effort to remedy
inequities, as in the depression era. The inequity of a different pricing stand-
ard for rich and poor consumers is patent, and the only apparent remedy is
a limitation on the pricing of consumer goods.
d. Regulatory Agency Supervision-A uniform Federal licensing law, en-
forced at the behest of regional offices with investigative authority and funds
would appear to be the only effective means of coping with blatant disregard
for legal principles. Such an agency, established under the commerce power
of the Federal government, modeled on the Federal Reserve System's super-
vision of member banks, endowed with authority to issue complaints on its
own initiative, and empowered to revoke licenses or impose intermediate
sanctions such as cease-and-desist orders, could attack the unfair consumer
practices of merchants at the roots-in the neighborhood itself. Nothing short
76 CAPLOVITZ, supra note 13 at 191.
77 See COHEN &c HANSON, supra note 18,
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of such a sweeping legislative enactment would effectively eradicate the un-
just practices which our society has allowed to become widespread. A pov-
erty-conscious Congress should be able to see the anomaly in providing wel-
fare aid to the poor and then allowing unscrupulous merchants to be the
primary beneficiaries of such aid.
e. Amending Rules of Law-Adoption of the "unconscionability" doctrine
by the framers of the Uniform Commercial Code was a stride toward alter-
ing traditional judicial protections afforded to credit merchants. Legislation
would be necessary to alleviate many of the other abuses in this area. One
study group has recommended a proposal which would limit the protection
of the finance companies under the holder in due course rule where the fi-
nance company is in reality acting as a principal to a transaction.78 This pro-
posal would be beneficial in attacking some of the problems discussed above.
The parol evidence rule also operates with undue harshness where a consumer
as been induced by misleading promises of salesmen.79
While these are the two protective legal doctrines which have the greatest
impact on the consumer, other areas where review of the law is necessary will
come to light upon further investigation of the consumer credit area of our
economy which, in this author's opinion, is desperately needed in many cases.
The proposals suggested above are designed to stimulate further considera-
tion of a serious problem for our society.
11 See, e.g., the proposal of a Washington, D. C. commission to amend retail installment
legislation, Washington Post, September 24, 1965, p. Al.
19See BLACK, supra note 40, at 148.
[Vol. XV
The Catholic University of America
Member, National Conference of Law Reviews
Law Review
VOLUME XV JANUARY 1966 NUMBER 1
THE BOARD OF EDITORS
JAMES A. HUNTER (Illinois) Editor-in-Chief
JAMES J. McGILLAN (New Hampshire) GERARD A. Dupuis (New York)
Article and Book Review Editor Research Editor
RICHARD J. FAVRETTro (New York) RICHARD L. WOODARD (Ohio)
Student Material Editor Research Editor
JOHN M. FEDDERS (Kentucky)
Business Editor
STAFF
SHEILA A. JOHNSON (Maryland) PATRICIA A. MURPHY (New York)
A. 0. LITrLE (Washington, D.C.) A. MICHAEL SULLIVAN, JR. (Rhode Island)
JAMES J. M. VAUGHAN (Pennsylvania)
COMPETITORS
KEVIN E. BOOTH (Connecticut) JAMES T. HANSING (Minnesota)
CHARLES F. CALLANAN (Washington, D.C.) THOMAS J. MCHALE (Connecticut)
NORMAN J. DAME (Maryland) JAMES A. NUGENT (Connecticut)
MARTIN J. DOCKERY (New York) GEORGE N. PAPPAS (New Jersey)
MARY E. FOLLIARD (Maryland) THOMAS F. PHALEN, JR. (Connecticut)
JAMES J. GALLAGHER (Washington) PHILIP J. TIERNEY (New York)
LUIS GUINOT, JR. (Puerto Rico) ANTHONY J. VILLANI (New York)
RALPH J. ROHrNER, Faculty Editor

